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Inside the Youth Justice Board:  
ambiguity and influence in New Labour’s youth justice  
Anna Souhami  
 
The announcement by the coalition government in October 2010 of its intention to 
dissolve the Youth Justice Board (YJB) and transfer its functions to the Ministry of 
Justice has once again plunged the youth justice system into a period of uncertainty.  
The promise by Minister Crispin Blunt, addressing the YJB convention in November, 
of “a once in a generation opportunity to think … about how we reform the youth 
justice system” (Blunt 2010) will have seemed wearingly familiar to those who have 
only recently lived through the New Labour government’s sweeping programme of 
reform. At the time of writing the YJB’s future hangs in the balance, with the House 
of Lords recently voting to reject the government’s plans to dissolve it.  Yet in the 
debates surrounding its fate there has been a striking lack of clarity about what, if 
anything, the effect of its closure will be. While many in the Lords debate described 
an unravelling of a decade of progress, others have been more equivocal.   As Rod 
Morgan, a previous Chair of the YJB, put it:  “there may yet be a downside to its 
abolition… But I am not in mourning and doubt I will be.” (Morgan 2010).   
 
Drawing on an ethnographic study of the operation of the YJB, this article explores 
why it is so difficult to identify what would be lost by its demise. The research 
reported here involved an 18 month period of fieldwork from 2006-71. For one 
calendar year, research focused on the internal operation of the YJB, during which I 
was given access to almost all YJB internal activities and documents, observed 
meetings and interviewed staff throughout the organisation. A second strand of 
research explored the regional operation of the YJB and how it was experienced 
locally: I shadowed regional monitors, observed the YJB’s assessment processes and 
conducted interviews and focus groups with YOT staff. The aims of my research were 
simply to explore what this central yet little understood organisation did and how it 
did it. Yet, after extensive fieldwork, I still struggle to answer these questions. Indeed, 
the most common observation about the YJB by the staff within it that it was so 
difficult to describe. As a newly appointed Board member put it:  
                                                 
1 A full account of the research, including a detailed methodology, will be published in a forthcoming 
book provisionally titled ‘Governing Youth Crime’. 
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‘This is the most puzzling organisation I have ever joined. I’ve never worked 
in an organisation where within three quarters of an hour someone couldn’t 
give me a reasonably coherent picture of what we do and how we work. No 
one here seems to be able to do it’. 
 
In fact,  the confusion about these fundamental aspects of the YJB’s identity and role 
is unsurprising: the YJB is an inherently ambiguous organisation. This article explores 
why it is so difficult to articulate what the YJB is and what it does, and how this 
ambiguity has made it simultaneously highly insecure and extremely productive, 
enabling it to extend its influence and activities beyond those initially envisaged in 
New Labour’s reforms. First of all, the following pages explore how the YJB was 
initially conceived. What was it set up to do?  
Transforming youth justice 
The YJB was established in 1998 as a central strand of the newly elected Labour 
government’s radical programme of youth justice reform. Following an extended 
period of consultation (Labour Party 1996, Home Office 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1997d, 
1997e, 1997f ) and the establishment of a Task Force on Youth Justice (Home Office 
1998),  the government concluded that the youth justice system they inherited was  
“in disarray. It simply does not work. It can scarcely be called a system at all” 
(Labour Party 1996:1).  It was inefficient, inactive and excusing. It was inconsistent, 
with significant variations in provision, quality and outcome of services across 
different areas of England and Wales. And it was incoherent, with no single 
government department responsible for youth crime, resulting in conflicts between the 
Home Office’s “criminal justice” approach towards young offenders and the 
“welfare” approach of the Department of Health (Labour Party 1996:9 ). The solution 
was a ‘radical overhaul’ of the structures, services and culture of the youth justice 
system, intended to bring about a new era in the way in which youth offending was 
thought about and managed (Labour Party 1996; Home Office 1997d).  
 
The establishment of the YJB was the cornerstone of this approach. The YJB was a 
new, executive non-departmental public body (NDPB), accountable initially to the 
Home Office (now to the Ministry of Justice) and comprised of a Board of 12 
members and a staff of advisors headed by a Chief Executive. It was intended to pull 
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together the supervision of the youth justice system from across government 
departments, consolidating their different approaches and providing direction and 
‘leadership’ to youth justice services; provide a “national focus for youth justice 
issues” (Home Office 1997d: 10), giving youth justice a specific policy presence in 
central government; and allow for the development of consistent standards and a 
coherent approach to the provision of services across England and Wales (1997a, 
1997g).  In this way, the creation of the YJB aimed to encourage the emergence of a 
consistent, distinct system of youth justice in England and Wales (Allen 2005, Pitts 
2001).  
 
To accomplish this, the YJB was given a wide range of statutory duties. It is 
responsible for the monitoring of all aspects of the youth justice system, on the basis 
of which it advises the Home Secretary on the operation and standards for the system,  
makes grants to local authorities, sets priorities for services (now delivered through 
newly created multi-agency Youth Offending Teams (YOTs)), identifies ‘effective 
practice’ in service delivery,  and issues training and guidance for practitioners.  In 
addition, in 2000 it became responsible for commissioning and purchasing secure 
places for children under 18.  
 
In order not to deflect from its monitoring and standard-setting role, it was decided 
the YJB should not manage directly local services (Youth Justice Task Force 1998: 
para 66)2. So, while YOTs were charged with a series of centrally defined duties and 
targets, they were given considerable control in the way in which these are carried out 
(Home Office 1997a, 1997g).  This type of ‘governing at a distance’  is typical of a 
new form of relations emerging in contemporary crime control in which a devolving 
of autonomy  to local agencies coexists with a tightening of regulation and 
surveillance of what they do (Crawford 1997). To this end the YJB established a vast 
network of monitoring processes through which it requires YOTs to provide an 
extensive array of information about the minutiae of practice, funding, management 
and outcomes. 
 
                                                 
2 The exception to this ‘arms length’ approach to the oversight of the youth justice system is the YJB’s 
relationship with the juvenile secure estate.  The commissioning/purchasing relationship necessarily 
brings about a more direct intervention in the management and operation of these institutions.  
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The YJB was therefore given a central role in directing the culture, organisation and 
activities of youth justice in England and Wales. Its role has been described as “broad 
and powerful” (Muncie 2000:30), representing as an “unprecedented centralisation of 
control over the system” (Pitts 2001:168).   However, in practice the operation of the 
YJB was simultaneously more extensive and more insecure than its statutory 
functions suggested.  
 
Eight years after its establishment, at the time my research began, the ambiguities and 
insecurities of its identity and role had started to become increasingly apparent. This 
was brought into focus by a marked shift in political climate.  
 
A changing climate 
In 2006 the YJB found themselves at a very different moment in Labour’s youth 
justice programme. Blair was coming to end of his period of office amid plummeting 
popularity. YJB staff described a fraught atmosphere in Whitehall: central 
government were “far less confident”, they were “pressing the panic buttons”. This 
was reflected in the way government worked: the cabinet office started to take direct 
control of new policy initiatives through the establishment of the Prime Minister’s 
Delivery Unit;  major government departments were suddenly split and reorganised. 
The Home Office appeared particularly vulnerable. During the research period, public 
outcry about the handling of foreign national prisoners led to the forced resignation of 
Charles Clarke, then Home Secretary, and his replacement by John Reid who resigned 
less than a year after that. The Home Office was put under review and found unfit for 
purpose. Towards the end of the year, the prison population reached crisis point, 
leading to public criticism of government policy by several leading figures in criminal 
justice including the Chair of the YJB, Rod Morgan, and culminating in his 
resignation in January 2007.   
 
 
Within the YJB, staff sensed that they were operating in volatile political climate over 
which they had little control, and in which there were very sudden transformations of 
departments, practices and careers.  In this context, the YJB’s position felt particularly 
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insecure.  Not only was its ‘sponsor’ department under intense and negative scrutiny3, 
but as youth justice straddles many different departmental areas it was confronted 
with the risk of  sudden policy changes from all directions. Moreover, it became 
harder for the YJB to demonstrate its effect.  It no longer had the politically exciting 
role of bringing about dramatic and widespread change, but the more modest task of 
sustaining it.  At the same time, it was evident that youth justice was no longer a 
priority within government. This in part protected the YJB from the vagaries of the 
political climate: as the Chair put it, the YJB were “not in John Reid’s [then Home 
Secretary] in-tray’. Yet the clear understanding was that scrutiny would eventually 
fall on the YJB, and when it did they would be in difficulty.  The YJB’s position thus 
appeared precarious.  This was made explicit by Baroness Scotland, then the Minister 
of State for Criminal Justice, addressing a meeting of the Board:  
“We’re doing all this in a very hostile environment which may change very 
rapidly. We’ve already lost one Home Secretary who was totally signed up to 
the agenda. We need to make sure this stuff is so embedded it can’t be done. 
We will be taken to the cleaners. … The YJB will be in a very, very painful 
position” 
 
In this context, it was felt particularly important for the YJB to be able to offer a 
compelling account of itself: as staff put it, “to tell a strong story”. Yet as the YJB 
became increasingly distanced from Labour’s original youth justice project, the 
difficulties in doing so became increasingly apparent. This appeared to be due to an 
inherent ambiguity in the structures and functions of the YJB that made its role 
difficult to define and articulate. As I will show, this ambiguity was often experienced 
by its staff as a source of deep insecurity, yet it appears to be precisely what has made 
the YJB a highly creative body,  allowing it to widen and deepen its sphere of 
influence and grow into a significantly different organisation from that originally 
envisaged in Labour’s reforms.  The following pages explore this in relation to two 
issues that became of crucial importance during the research, both of which went to 
the core of the YJB’s identity. Firstly, is it part of central government, or not? And 
secondly, what is its relationship with YOTs?   
                                                 
3 In fact, reflecting the instability of government organisation , since 2007 the ‘sponsor’ of the YJB has 
changed rapidly three times: from the Home Office to the Ministry of Justice, to joint ownership by 
Ministry of Justice and the Department for Education and Skills in November 2007, before reverting to 
sole sponsorship by the Ministry of Justice in May 2010.  
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Inside or outside government?  
The ambiguity of the YJB’s relationship with central government stemmed from its 
status as a non-departmental public body (NDPB). It was established as an NDPB 
partly because it could bypass civil service bureaucracy and bring about change 
quickly. Transforming the youth justice system was a vast task: as one official 
explained, if it was left to the Home Office it ‘would be like turning round a 
juggernaut, it would take years’. In addition, positioning the YJB outside central 
government allowed experts in the field a direct role in advising on youth justice 
policy, either as board members or as staff seconded from practice.  
 
At the time of its establishment, the independent status of the YJB was largely 
nominal. Many of those connected to the YJB had close connections to then Home 
Secretary Jack Straw: the first Chair, Norman Warner, had been Straw’s senior policy 
adviser; the Chief Executive, Mark Perfect, had been the co-author of the Audit 
Commission’s report on which the reforms had largely been based; other Board 
members had been Labour advisers or involved in the ‘Youth Justice Task Force’ set 
up by the government in advance of the Crime and Disorder Act.   
 
By 2006 however, the YJB’s relationship with central government had become more 
tenuous. The YJB had expanded steadily from a staff of six advisers in 1998 to an 
organisation of  212, the majority of whom had backgrounds not in the civil service 
but in criminal justice or related fields. The Chair and Board no longer had close links 
with government but were senior figures in related fields: as one Board member 
described them, they were simply ‘a bunch of passionate and committed individuals’. 
Further, as the organisation matured and became more deeply embedded, the YJB had 
inevitably started to develop its own culture and ethos to work with young people. 
The meaning of independence – and the YJB’s identity – was now at issue.  
 
 
There was a strong view among some in the YJB that their independence was an 
intrinsic part of their identity and thus of their role. Their distance from government 
allowed the Board to act as a ‘critical friend’ and publicly voice concerns about 
government policy.  As one Board member put it, “I didn’t join the Board to get on 
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my knees. I joined it to make a difference” So, throughout his tenure as Chair, Rod 
Morgan strongly criticised the government for ‘demonizing’ young people through 
initiatives such as ASBOs, and widely publicised a crisis in the rising prison 
population. As he saw it, ‘this is the advantage of us not being civil servants and being 
in my position’.   Yet others interpreted their position differently. One Board member 
said:  
Whether we like it or not, we take the King’s shilling. We are not an 
independent agency. We are funded by government, therefore we are an arm 
of government. … We are not a pressure group.  
The YJB’s statutory functions gave little clarity to their position. For example, their 
duty to ‘advise the Home Secretary’ was elastic enough to allow for either 
interpretation. As the Chair argued, public criticism of government policy could be 
seen as an intrinsic part of their role:  “We have a statutory obligation to advise 
ministers if policy is not working’.  
 
However the meaning of the YJB’s independent status became a crucially important 
issue,  not just of its identity but of its survival. By drawing attention to its contingent 
relationship with government the YJB risked being cut adrift, compromising their 
ability to influence policy and making their own position deeply insecure. As one 
Board member put it, “my view is that if we want to commit suicide we should carry 
on criticising government. If we want to be useful as an organisation, we should 
stop”.   
 
These issues crystallised around the launch of the Respect Action Plan in January 
2006.  The plan covered issues directly within the sphere of YJB interests, such as 
parenting, school attendance and involving young people in ‘constructive activities’ 
(Respect Task Force 2006).  However, the YJB were not consulted in its 
development, only learning of the Action Plan the day before its launch.  For many in 
the YJB,  this  was “payback” for Rod Morgan’s public criticism of ASBOs: by 
placing themselves in opposition to central government they had forfeited their 
influence within it. A visit by Louise Casey, the head of the Respect Task Force, to a 
Board meeting proved this perception correct. Responding to Board members’ 
frustration at being excluded from the initiative, she said:    
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 “You need to make up your minds where you sit. There’s an expectation that 
you want independence, you can say what you want. … But it’s not unusual 
for a government producing something as contentious as this to work within 
government very privately. If you want to come out and criticise things that’s 
up to you, it’s your prerogative as an NDPB to do so. But you can’t have it 
both ways. I wasn’t treating you as part of the family”.  
 
However, the position of the YJB was in fact more complex than this. While it was a 
delicate balance, their ambiguous identity in fact placed them simultaneously inside 
and outside government: in Louise Casey’s terms, they could, and did, ‘have it both 
ways’. So, for example, it was the very uncertainty of their status that allowed the 
YJB - unlike any other body sponsored by the Home Office - to create for themselves 
the role of ‘critical friend’. This enabled them to adopt simultaneously a position as a 
public critic of government policy, whilst retaining a privileged role in those policy 
discussions . The ability of the YJB to slip between positions allowed them influence 
with different audiences both within and outside the youth justice system. In 
particular, the ability of the YJB to distance themselves from central government 
appears to have had a significant effect on their credibility among practitioners in the 
field. For example, as a result of Rod Morgan’s public criticism of government 
policies YOT staff felt that the Chair of the YJB “represents all of us sitting round this 
table”; with him at the helm of the YJB “we sleep better”; his resignation as Chair 
“fills us with dismay”.  In the context of a relationship of control such credibility and 
trust was undoubtedly useful.  In this sense, as well as being a source of insecurity, 
the ambiguous identity of the YJB was also productive, allowing it to retain influence 
with central government while maintaining credibility with those on whom it 
depended for the delivery of services.  
Arms length or hands on?  
A second area of confusion in the YJB’s role was its relationship with service 
delivery. As outlined above, in theory the YJB has an ‘arms length’ relationship with 
YOTs: it ‘oversees’ what they do by demanding regular performance data, but does 
not directly manage them.  If YOTs fail to achieve their targets or provide their 
returns, the YJB can require the local authority to intervene but has little recourse for 
intervention itself. The YJB provides funding for YOTs which it could potentially 
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withdraw. While this forms a relatively small proportion of YOT resources it is 
clearly a significant amount4 and moreover is the only source of dedicated, ring-
fenced funding for youth justice services.  However, many officials felt financial 
sanctions would be highly unlikely: if a YOT was struggling, withdrawing funding 
risked significantly damaging already suffering services. As one official explained, 
their  mechanisms of control over YOTs were thus somewhat intangible:  “it  [YJB] 
has had a clearly defined carrot but a rather undefined stick”.  
 
Staff explained that the YJB were therefore in the somewhat confusing position of 
being accountable for the performance of the youth justice system but not responsible 
for its services. Unsurprisingly perhaps, this was almost wholly misunderstood by 
those outside the YJB. As one official said, this was a source of considerable 
insecurity: 
If it goes pear shaped, we get the blame either way. Ministers won’t make the 
subtle distinction. It will wash back to the YJB. There’s no one else to blame. 
But moreover, the intangibility of what it was to ‘govern at a distance’ represented a 
serious challenge to the legitimacy and purpose of the YJB. If they did not have a 
clear and direct impact on local services, what did they actually do?  As the then 
Chief Executive explained:  
“The problem for the Youth Justice Board is that the role has been very very 
difficult to articulate and describe … and its not understood and it’s difficult to 
explain and people just say ‘well are you responsible for [youth justice] or are 
you not, and if you’re not, what are you there for?’” 
 
But to confuse the relationship further, the YJB’s dealings with YOTs in fact 
developed in a very different way. This was enabled by their statutory duty to 
‘monitor the operation of the youth justice system’, which again is open to a myriad 
of interpretations. A particular understanding evolved in the YJB in which it came to 
monitor not the performance of the entire system against particular targets, as 
originally envisaged (Home Office 1997a), but the operation of YOTs.  Moreover, 
this data was not used to advise the Home Secretary on the functioning of the youth 
justice system (where broader aggregate figures are required) but, as a former Board 
member put it, “as a precursor to taking action where performance is failing” (Allen 
                                                 
4 In 2005-6, it formed an average of 20.5% of all YOT funding (Youth Justice Board 2006) 
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2005: 30). Thus the YJB required YOTs to provide vast amounts of case level data 
about they way they work with children, partners and programmes, how they do it and 
how often. This data was then returned to YOTs to encourage them to improve their 
practice. To facilitate this process, regional offices were established throughout 
England and Wales from which monitors visit local YOTs to ‘validate’ the data 
produced and track progress against closely prescribed ways of establishing and 
running particular schemes.  Exploiting their ability as an NDPB to appoint non-
governmental staff, the YJB specified regional staff should be have backgrounds in 
youth justice practice or related fields so that their input would have value and 
credibility. Thus, describing his regional monitor, one YOT manager said:  
“She understands what delivery’s about. She understands what I’m going 
through. She understands what delivery is. There’s no way that a civil servant 
can come and talk to me about social change or about policy implementation. 
They just don’t understand it’.  
Moreover, when YOTs were struggling, YJB staff could directly intervene: a team of 
performance improvement consultants was created to offer tailor made programmes 
for areas in which YOTs were failing. 
 
In this way, through the monitoring function, the boundaries between the YJB and 
YOTs became blurred, allowing for flows of people, information and ideas between 
practice and central government. At the same time, the distinction between the ‘arms 
length’ and ‘hands on’ relationship with service delivery became increasingly 
ambiguous. Yet while it made the YJB’s role hard to define and was experienced as a 
source of considerable insecurity, this ambiguity was, again, very useful, allowing the 
YJB to extend its control and influence in areas in which it ostensibly had very little.  
 
First, the form of monitoring that evolved gave the YJB a channel to provide detailed 
guidance and input directly to YOTs.  As one regional monitor put it,  ‘it’s our only 
chance to go into the YOT and talk to them about what they do’. YJB staff explained 
this role was both required and enabled by the new structures: YOTs found 
themselves swamped by a barrage of new policies and procedures, yet as all youth 
justice expertise youth justice was now drawn together in the YJB and YOTs there 
were simply no other outside sources of help.  An official explained:  
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‘If we don’t do it, who else will. There's no one else the YOTs can turn to. The 
only experience of youth offending is in YOTs, and at the centre. There’s no 
one else.’ 
 
At the same time, this form of input gave the YJB scope for control and intervention 
beyond that ostensibly allowed by their ‘hands off’ relationship with local services. 
The form of monitoring practices that evolved provided the YJB with access to a 
micro level scrutiny of the minutiae of service delivery and even the opportunity to 
intervene directly into local services. Further, through the self regulation it demanded, 
YOTs were co-opted into becoming part of their own control (e.g. Rose 2000). In this 
way, under the guise of support, relationships and advice, monitoring input also 
allowed for the extension and multiplication of surveillance and control (see also 
Garland 1985).   
 
But in addition, the development of the regional monitoring role appears to have 
allowed the YJB to widen and deepen their influence in localities, thereby helping 
embed youth justice services into the local landscape.  Over the course of the decade, 
the Labour government’s plans for an ‘unprecedented era of devolution’ (Kelly 2006) 
led to a radical restructuring of local government in which strategy, priorities, funding 
and management of services increasingly became determined at a local level 
(Department for Communities and Local Government 2006).  As a central body with 
limited levers of control and no physical presence in local authorities, the YJB’s 
ability to ensure that a focus on youth justice services was maintained locally was in 
theory very limited. Yet through the development of regional teams, YJB staff were 
now located in the centre of local networks and negotiations. One of the architects of 
the YJB’s regional strategy explained:  
“It was the YJB feeling, hang on, we’re the experts but we’re not being 
listened to so we need to have people out there who will be heard… I think it 
was a naked grasp for power, influence. We’ve got to be out there”.   
Further, the monitoring process itself also appears to have enabled YOTs to become 
more firmly established among their local partners. The forms of knowledge and data 
that the YJB demand are those that came to have a particular authority in government 
more widely. Through the reporting processes demanded by the YJB, YOTs very 
quickly had to have in place extremely sophisticated ways of generating, analysing 
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and distributing it. As agencies jostled for position and funding, the armoury of data 
they acquired put YOTs at a strong advantage locally. A YOT manager explained:  
“The performance framework of the Board began to put YOTs firmly at 
number one in the league in terms of being able to get extra money from their 
strategic forum because we didn’t have to do anything. …Performance 
framework, re-offending rates, school attendance rates. We just had all the 
management information. So we were extremely well armed going to any 
forum to argue for funds because we had it in our hands.”  
This appeared to have contributed to an increasing sense of status and confidence 
among YOTs. As one YOT manager put it, “We’ve probably moved to a position 
where we think we can do anything. OK, we know what we want, how are we going 
to get it.”  
 
After the YJB? 
In this way, the YJB evades easy definition. It is simultaneously inside and outside 
government; with an arms length yet hands-on relationship with local services. It has 
blurred the boundaries between practice and policy; between government and 
delivery.  And it has been able to stretch its statutory duties into new areas of activity 
without clearly overstepping its defined role.  It is the ambiguity inherent in its 
structures that has allowed it to slip between roles and identities easily, enabling it to 
expand its reach beyond that envisaged in the creation of New Labour’s youth justice 
programme. Yet at the same time, it is this ambiguity that makes the YJB insecure.  In 
a volatile political climate, its slipperiness may appear both confusing and risky. It is 
not straightforwardly part of central government, yet is connected closely enough to 
be a particularly potent source of embarrassment should it choose to become one. It 
invests considerable effort and resources in monitoring youth justice services, yet 
cannot directly control or manage them. In this context, the difficulty of giving a clear 
account of what, exactly it is and what it does makes the YJB highly vulnerable.  
 
Of course, arguably the most important way for the YJB to give an account of itself is 
to demonstrate its effect. What have all these extended activities and efforts been for? 
How far has the YJB actually progressed the aim of the youth justice system and 
reduced youth offending?   
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Despite the importance of this question to any assessment of the YJB, it is not one 
that was asked by the coalition government in making the decision to abolish it. 
Indeed, ‘performance’ was not one of the ‘tests’ taken into account when deciding the 
fate of any of the 192 arms-lengths bodies dissolved by the government (House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounts 2011: 3).  Yet it is on the basis of its 
performance that the YJB may well be reprieved. The House of Commons Committee 
of Public Accounts (2011: 3) holds the YJB responsible for a fall in the number of 
young people entering the youth justice system, the number held in custody and the 
amount of reoffending committed by young people. At the time of writing, the House 
of Lords have voted to overturn the government’s decision to abolish the YJB due to 
its effectiveness. Indeed, Lord Woolf argued that ‘it would be sacrilege if.. we took 
out of the criminal justice system something that works’ (Hansard 28th March 2011: 
Column 961). For the moment, the official assessment appears to be that, whatever 
the YJB is, it works. 
 
This assessment will undoubtedly be held up to scrutiny over the coming months. 
However, while an analysis of the impact of the YJB is outside the scope of the paper, 
it is important simply to note that its effects cannot easily be captured by statistical 
changes in reoffending. First, any change in rates of offending – in either direction - 
cannot be straightforwardly connected to what it does.  So, for example, it is widely 
acknowledged that policy changes in other areas of criminal justice, health or 
education can have a potent effect on rates of offending, whether through its impact 
on the lives of vulnerable young people and thus their offending behaviour, or on 
constructions of offending through counting rules, definition, or process5. Further, 
even if it were possible to demonstrate an unproblematic connection between the 
services the YJB supports and changes in offending behaviour (for discussion of the 
difficulties see for example Meyerson 1991, Souhami 2007),  given its arms length 
relationship to service,  the YJB has little control over how services are delivered 
locally and thus little ownership of the results. Changes in offending behaviour are 
instead produced in the complex flows between the centre and localities.  
                                                 
5 This was demonstrated most clearly during the research period when one of the YJB’s primary targets 
-  to reduce the number of first time entrants to the youth justice system by 5% in three years – was 
derailed by a new police target to bring more offences to justice, effectively incentivising the police to 
prosecute more young people, who commit relatively minor and easily detectable offences.  
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But in addition, the most important effects of the YJB may be those least amenable to 
measurement. The slipperiness of the YJB seems to have allowed it to develop deeply 
embedded relationships between the centre and localities and a widened influence in 
local areas, while maintaining a position in the central policy making processes.  In 
the context of an increasing incoherence at the centre and an increasing devolution of 
local government, this may well be of crucial importance in keeping youth offending 
on a national and local agendas, helping retain dedicated, ring-fenced funding for 
YOTs and preserving their presence and status in local authorities. In other words, it 
is this activity that may now underpin the task of maintaining a coherent, consistent, 
national youth justice system for which the YJB was established.  
 
However, questions of the YJB’s effects appear to be irrelevant to the decisions about 
its future. So far the coalition government has shown little interest in what the YJB 
does or the costs or benefits of its closure. Unlike its establishment, its proposed 
abolition has not come after an extended period of consultation and analysis of the 
needs of the youth justice system. Not even the Board was consulted about the 
decision to dissolve it (House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee 
2011: para 26).  Instead it comes simply as part of a rushed, headline-grabbing 
programme of cost-cutting wholly unrelated to youth offending.  As such there is no 
plan for what, if anything will replace it.   As befits an essentially ambiguous 
organisation, the effects of the YJB currently appear equally hard to describe and 
measure.  It is likely that the full effect of its activities – and the full effects of its 
closure - will only become evident once it has gone.   
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